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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WAIVERS OF IMMUNITY APPLY ONLY WHERE THE 
IMMUNITY IS QUALIFIED, NOT WHERE THE 
IMMUNITY IS ABSOLUTE 
Respondent argues in her Brief that immunity is waived in 
the instant case by specific waivers set forth _n the Govern-
mental Immunity Act. See Brief of Respondent at 2-3. Such 
would be the case if the first paragraph of Section 63-30-3 of 
the Act were applicable here. The first paragraph of that 
section, however, does not apply. Rather, it is the second 
paragraph of Section 63-30-3 which is applicable to this case. 
The Section, in its entirety, reads as follows: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from 
suit for any injury which results from the exercise of 
a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospi-
tal, nursing home, or other governmental health care 
facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or 
other professional health care clinical training 
program conducted in either public or private 
facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other natural 
disasters and the construction, repair, and operation 
of flood and storm systems by governmental entities 
are considered to be governmental functions, and gov-
ernmental entities and their officers and employees 
are immune from suit for any injury or damage result-
ing from those activities. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1953, as amended). As can be seen by 
the clear, unambiguous and specific language of the second 
paragraph of the section, repair and operation of flood and 
storm systems by a governmental entity are governmental 
functions for which absolute immunity attaches. 
There is no language in the second paragraph suggesting 
that the qualified immunity of the first paragraph of the 
Section applies. Rather, very explicit and specific language 
in the second paragraph states clearly and graphically that for 
the particular, specific governmental functions listed there, 
that of management of flood waters and other natural disasters 
and the construction, repair and operation of flood and storm 
systems, an immunity with no qualifiers or waivers is 
applicable. 
In Utah, principles of statutory construction require that 
specific provisions take precedent over general provisions. 
See Ute-Cal Land Development v. Intermountain Stock Exchange, 
628 P.2d 1278, 1282 n.15 (Utah 1981); Millett v. Clark Clinic 
Corp., 609 P.2d 934 (Utah 1980). Here, the second paragraph's 
specific enumeration of particular types of governmental func-
tion, with clear language stating emphatically that immunity 
applies, takes precedent over the general provisions of the 
first paragraph. 
Finally, where there is absolute immunity, no waivers are 
applicable. Only where the Act expressly allows a waiver, can 
a waiver be considered. See Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 
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(Utah 1983). Thus, where, as here, a governmental entity's 
repair or operation of a storm system allegedly caused injury, 
the applicable immunity is not qualified and the Act's waivers 
of immunity do not apply. 
POINT II 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT CAN BE DETERMINED FROM 
THE FACE OF THE STATUTE 
Respondent asserts that the 1984 amendment which added the 
second paragraph of Section 63-30-3 to the Act "was intended as 
protection only in times of flood." See Brief of Respondent at 
4. If such is the case, why then did the Legislature add 
superfluous language to the amendment giving immunity to the 
construction, repair and operation of flood and storm systems? 
If the amendment was intended to provide immunity only when 
flood waters were present, then "the construction, repair, and 
operation of flood and storm systems" during flooding condi-
tions would be included within or encompassed by the plain and 
ordinary meaning of "management of flood waters." 
The Legislature uses words and phases "advisedly," and such 
are to be given effect. West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 
446 (Utah 1982). The use of the conjunctive "and" after the 
phrase "management of flood waters and other natural disas-
ters," followed by specific enumeration of the governmental 
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activities of constructing, repairing and operating flood and 
storm systems, indicates a clear intent to add to the statute 
activities different than those of managing flood waters. 
The legislative intent is clear from the plain language of 
the statute. Immunity is granted to governmental entities 
while constructing or repairing or operating flood and storm 
systems prior to, after, in anticipation of, in response to, or 
to prevent or minimize damages from flooding. In an arid, 
desert state like Utah, flooding is likely to come from severe 
thunderstorms. The Legislature therefore included "storm 
systems" in the statute to allow for governmental activities 
specifically designed to deal with such, in addition to what 
otherwise might be done with regard to flooding in general. 
Incentive, or in other words, immunity from suit, is thereby 
provided governmental entities which make a concerted effort to 
avoid having to manage flood waters and be faced with the 
injury or damage that naturally occur from actual flooding, by 
constructing, repairing and operating flood and storm systems 
when flood waters are not present. These systems, by their 
nature, are designed to alleviate, minimize or prevent flooding. 
The Legislature, in its wisdom, deemed such governmental 
functions to be worthy of unqualified immunity. Both respon-
dent and the court below obviously disagree with that wisdom, 
but such disagreement cannot be the basis for the lower court 
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refusing to give effect to the literal wording and obvious 
meaning of the statute. See West Jordan, 656 P.2d at 446; Gord 
v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449, 451 (1967). 
POINT III 
DISTRICT COURT RULINGS WERE CITED TO SUPPORT 
THE ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY OF SECTION 63-30-3 
In this appellant's Brief, numerous state District Court 
decisions were cited and attached as an appendix for the 
purpose of showing this Court that the second paragraph of 
Section 63-30-3 had been interpreted and applied by those 
courts as granting absolute immunity to governmental entities 
and employees for the governmental functions enumerated there-
in. Respondent skews the rulings of the lower courts in an 
attempt to find support for her assertion that the second para-
graph of Section 63-30-3 applies only where flooding actually 
occurs. See Brief of Respondent at 5-7. At issue in those 
cases was the same legal issue posed here: whether the second 
paragraph of Section 63-30-3 grants absolute immunity to govern-
mental entities for the management of flood waters and the 
construction, repair and operation of flood and storm systems. 
Universally, with the exception of the lower court in the 
instant action, the state's District Courts have ruled that 
absolute immunity does attach for those governmental functions. 
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None of the rulings cited dealt with the other issue 
presented here: whether flood waters must be present before 
Section 63-30-3 applies. This appellant did not cite the 
rulings as support for its argument on that specific issue, but 
rather for the argument that Section 63-30-3 does in fact grant 
immunity which is unqualified and absolute. Reliance on these 
lower court rulings for any other proposition here is 
unwarranted. 
POINT IV 
RESPONDENT DOES NOT DISPUTE THE PRINCIPLES 
OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION SET FORTH IN 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Nowhere in respondent's Brief does she dispute the legal 
principles of statutory construction as set forth and relied 
upon by this appellant in its Brief. The principles are sound 
and are dispositive here. The lower court, in denying this 
governmental entity's motion to dismiss, failed to apply these 
principles. Respondent failed to dispute them. The error of 
the lower court's interpretation of the statutory language, 
then, must now be corrected. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, and in appellant's Brief, 
the lower court's denial of Pleasant View City's motion to 
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dismiss should be reversed and the matter should be remanded to 
the District Court for dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. 
DATED this 7%)' day of March, 1988. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Allan L.OLarS 
Christopher C. Fuller 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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